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Abstract
Starting off from the infinitary system for common knowledge over multi-modal epistemic logic presented in [L. Alberucci,
G. Jäger, About cut elimination for logics of common knowledge, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 133 (2005) 73–99], we apply
the finite model property to “finitize” this deductive system. The result is a cut-free, sound and complete sequent calculus for
common knowledge.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Common knowledge and common belief are important and interesting topics in areas such as computer science,
logic, game theory, artificial intelligence, psychology and many other fields for which coordination among “agents” is
of great importance. Formalizations of reasoning with and about common knowledge have been widely discussed in
the literature, for example in Barwise [2,3] and in the textbooks Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi [4] as well as Meyer
and van der Hoek [6], to give only a few examples.
In connection with calculi for common knowledge the question often arises whether there is a complete and cut-
free system which has the subformula property and other desired structural properties. In the following we will show
that such a cut-free sequent calculus for common knowledge indeed exists. In order to design it, we start off from
the infinitary system Kωn (C) for common knowledge over multi-modal epistemic logic presented in Alberucci and
Jäger [1]. Then we recall that the finite model property is available for common knowledge and make use of this
fact for restricting Kωn (C) to a finite system K<ωn (C). All we have to do is to change the ω-rule (ωC) for common
knowledge (see below) in Kωn (C) to the finite rule (<ωC) in which only a finite number of the infinitely many premises
of (ωC) is used.
Obviously, every formula provable in Kωn (C) is also provable in K<ωn (C). Hence K<ωn (C) is stronger than Kωn (C),
and thus the completeness of Kωn (C) implies that of K<ωn (C). On the other hand, the finite model property of common
knowledge will guarantee the consistency of K<ωn (C). However, K<ωn (C) is a fairly “untypical” system in the sense
that the number of premises needed in the rule (<ωC) depends on the complexity of the conclusion of (<ωC).
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: jaeger@iam.unibe.ch (G. Jäger), kretz@iam.unibe.ch (M. Kretz), tstuder@iam.unibe.ch (T. Studer).
1 Research partly supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation.1570-8683/$ – see front matter © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jal.2006.02.003
682 G. Jäger et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 5 (2007) 681–6892. Basic semantic notions
Good expository introductions to and detailed motivations of an approach to common knowledge in the context of
multi-modal propositional logics are presented, for example, in Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi [4] and in Meyer and
van der Hoek [6]. In the following we take up the syntactic and semantic notions of Alberucci and Jäger [1], which
are based on these two textbooks, and refer the reader to this article for further details.
Ln(C) is our standard language for multi-modal logic; it comprises a set PROP of atomic propositions, typically
indicated by P,Q, . . . (possibly with subscripts), the propositional connectives ∨ and ∧, the epistemic operators
K1,K2, . . . ,Kn and the common knowledge operator C; in addition we assume that there is an auxiliary symbol ∼ for
forming the complements of atomic propositions and dual epistemic operators.
The formulas α,β, γ, . . . (possibly with subscripts) of Ln(C) and the length (α) of each Ln(C) formula α are
inductively generated as follows:
1. All atomic propositions P and their complements P˜ are Ln(C) formulas;
(P ) := (P˜ ) := 1.
2. If α and β are Ln(C) formulas, so are (α ∨ β) and (α ∧ β);

(
(α ∨ β)) := ((α ∧ β)) := (α) + (β).
3. If α is an Ln(C) formula, so are Ki (α) and K˜i (α);

(
Ki (α)
) := (˜Ki (α)) := (α) + 1.
4. If α is an Ln(C) formula, so are C(α) and C˜(α);

(
C(α)
) := (C˜(α)) := (α) · n + n + 1.
As usual we omit parentheses if there is no danger of confusion and abbreviate the remaining logical connectives as
usual; in addition we set
E(α) := K1(α) ∧ · · · ∧ Kn(α) and E˜(α) := K˜1(α) ∨ · · · ∨ K˜n(α).
The factor and summand n, i.e. the number of agents, in the definition of (C(α)) and (C˜(α)) ensure that we always
have

(
E(α)
)= (˜E(α))< (C(α))= (C˜(α)).
Formulas Ki (α) are typically interpreted—on the intuitive level—as agent i knows (believes) that α so that E(α)
means that everybody knows α. But observe that this does not mean that α is common knowledge.
Common knowledge of α is much stronger: it implies (i) that everybody knows α and, in addition, (ii) that every-
body knows that everybody knows α, (iii) that everybody knows that everybody knows that every knows α plus (iv) all
further iterations thereof. To make this precise, we inductively introduce for all natural numbers m the iterations Em(α)
as
E0(α) := α and Em+1(α) := E(Em(α))
and then represent common knowledge of α as the infinitary conjunction of all Em(α) for m 1,
C(α) ≈
∧
i1
Em(α).
The Ln(C) formulas P˜ act as negations of the atomic propositions P and are needed together with the duals K˜i and C˜
of the modal operators Ki and C, respectively, in forming the negations ¬α of general Ln(C) formulas α (by making
use of de Morgan’s laws and the law of double negation):
1. If α is the atomic proposition P , then ¬α is P˜ ; if α is the formula P˜ , then ¬α is P .
2. If α is the formula (β ∨ γ ), then ¬α is (¬β ∧ ¬γ ); if α is the formula (β ∧ γ ), then ¬α is (¬β ∨ ¬γ ).
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4. If α is the formula C(β), then ¬α is C˜(¬β); if α is the formula C˜(β), then ¬α is C(¬β).
We turn to the semantics of Ln(C). As always, a Kripke-frame for Ln(C) is a (n + 1)-tuple
M= (W,K1, . . . ,Kn)
consisting of a non-empty set W of worlds and n binary accessibility relations K1, . . . ,Kn on W ; the set of worlds of
a Kripke-frameM is often denoted by |M|. Besides that, a valuation in a Kripke-frameM is a function V from the
atomic propositions PROP to the power set Pow(|M|) of |M|,
V : PROP → Pow(|M|).
Finally, the truth-set ‖α‖MV of an Ln(C) formula α with respect to a Kripke-frameM= (W,K1, . . . ,Kn) and a valu-
ation V inM is defined, as usual in multi-modal logics, by induction an the complexity of α with an additional clause
for treating the operator C:
‖P‖MV := V(P ),
‖P˜‖MV := W \ ‖P‖MV ,
‖α ∨ β‖MV := ‖α‖MV ∪ ‖β‖MV ,
‖α ∧ β‖MV := ‖α‖MV ∩ ‖β‖MV ,∥∥Ki (α)∥∥MV :=
{
v ∈ W : w ∈ ‖α‖MV for all w so that (v,w) ∈Ki
}
,∥∥K˜i (α)∥∥MV :=
{
v ∈ W : w ∈ ‖α‖MV for some w so that (v,w) ∈Ki
}
,∥∥C(α)∥∥MV :=
⋂{∥∥Em(α)∥∥MV : m 1
}
,
∥∥C˜(α)∥∥MV :=
⋃{∥∥E˜m(α)∥∥MV : m 1
}
.
Based on this notion, we say that an Ln(C) formula α is valid in the Kripke-frameM, in symbols
M |= α,
provided that for all worlds w from |M| and all valuations V inM we have w ∈ ‖α‖MV .
For notational simplicity we confine ourselves to accessibility relations without any specific properties (e.g. reflex-
ivity, transitivity) with the consequence that only the K-axioms are satisfied with respect to our modalities K1, . . . ,Kn;
in particular, knowledge of a fact does not imply the truth of this fact. Extensions of the following approach to, for
example, reflexive and transitive relations on the semantic side and inclusion of the T-axioms and the S4-axioms on
the syntactic side would work without any problems.
Our semantics of C reflects the so-called iterative interpretation of common knowledge,
M |= C(α) ⇐⇒ M |=
∧
m1
Em(α),
mentioned already above. Alternatively, we could also treat common knowledge in the sense of the greatest fixed point
interpretation since
(∗)∥∥C(α)∥∥MV =
⋃{
X ⊂ |M|: X = ∥∥E(α) ∧ E(Q)∥∥MV[Q:=X]
}
where Q is chosen to be an atomic proposition which does not occur in α and V[Q := X] is the valuation which
maps Q to X and otherwise agrees with V . A proof of Eq. (∗) can be found, for example, in Fagin, Halpern, Moses
and Vardi [4].
Hilbert-style axiomatizations for common knowledge which are sound and complete with respect to this semantics
are discussed in full detail in, for example, Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi [4] and Meyer and van der Hoek [6].
However, this type of axiomatization is not needed for our following considerations, and so we turn to an infinitary
Tait-style system immediately.
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The iterative character of our approach to common knowledge lends itself to a formulation within infinitary deduc-
tive systems in which C(α) can be derived by a kind of ω-rule from the infinitely many premises
E1(α),E2(α), . . . ,Em(α), . . .
for all natural numbers m 1, just as in the semantic interpretation of C(α), introduced in the previous section. In the
following we take up the approach of Alberucci and Jäger [1] and reconsider the system Kωn (C) introduced there.
Kωn (C) is formulated as a Tait-style calculus which derives finite sets of Ln(C) formulas rather than individual
Ln(C) formulas. These finite sets of Ln(C) formulas are denoted by the capital Greek letters Γ,Δ,Π, . . . (possibly
with subscripts) and have to be interpreted disjunctively. We often write (for example) α,β,Γ,Δ for the union {α,β}∪
Γ ∪ Δ. In addition, if Γ is the set {α1, . . . , αm}, we often use the following convenient abbreviations:
Γ ∨ := α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αm,
K˜i (Γ ) :=
{
K˜i (α1), . . . , K˜i (αm)
}
,
C˜(Γ ) := {C˜(α1), . . . , C˜(αm)}.
The axioms and rules of Kωn (C) consist of the usual propositional axioms and rules of Tait-calculi, of rules for the
epistemic operators Ki with incorporated formulas C˜(Δ) plus rules for introducing C˜ and ω-like rules for C. More
precisely, Kωn (C) contains the following collections of axioms and rules, with P being any atomic proposition, α and
β any Ln(C) formulas and Γ any finite set of Ln(C) formulas.
I. Axioms of Kωn (C)
(ID) P, P˜ ,Γ.
II. Propositional rules of Kωn (C)
(∨) α,β,Γ
α ∨ β,Γ ,
(∧) α,Γ β,Γ
α ∧ β,Γ .
III. Ki -rules of Kωn (C)
(Ki )
α,Γ, C˜(Δ)
Ki (α), K˜i (Γ ), C˜(Δ),Π
.
III. C˜-rules of Kωn (C)
(C˜)
E˜(α),Γ
C˜(α),Γ
.
IV. ωC-rules of Kn(C)
(ωC)
. . .Em(α),Γ . . . (for all m 1)
C(α),Γ
.
Observe that these axioms and rules of our Tait-calculus Kωn (C) do not include the usual cut rule, i.e. the rule
(Cut)
α,Γ ¬α,Γ
Γ
,
which will be shown to be admissible later. In fact, all rules of Kωn (C) satisfy the so-called subformula property,
provided that we regard all Em(α) as subformulas of C(α).
The subformula property of a rule (R) means that all formulas in the premises of (R) are subformulas of the
formulas in its conclusion. Clearly, the subformula property is a useful feature in the context of proof search since it
restricts the search space for the reconstruction of proofs significantly.
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ordinals, which are denoted by the small Greek letters σ, τ, η, ξ, . . . (possibly with subscripts), to measure the length
of proofs.
Starting from its axioms and rules of inference, derivability in Kωn (C) is introduced as usual. For arbitrary ordinals σ
and finite sets Γ of Ln(C) formulas the notion Kωn (C) σ Γ is defined by induction on σ as follows:
1. If Γ is an axiom of Kωn (C), then we have Kωn (C) σ Γ for all σ .
2. If Kωn (C) σi Γi and σi < σ for all premises Γi of a rule of Kωn (C), then we have Kωn (C) σ Γ for the conclusion
Γ of this rule.
Kωn (C) <σ Γ means Kωn (C) τ Γ for some ordinal τ < σ , and Kωn (C)  Γ means Kωn (C) τ Γ for some ordinal τ .
Furthermore, Kωn (C) + (Cut) σ α is defined analogously to Kωn (C) σ α with the rules (Cut) being admitted as
additional rules of inference.
The system Kωn (C) has a minor drawback: Suppose that α is provable in Kωn (C), say
Kωn (C) σ α
for some ordinal σ . Then we need something like σ +m · n steps to derive Em(α) from α, and afterwards (ωC) yields
Kωn (C) σ+ω C(α).
By adding the auxiliary rules of the form (for all natural numbers m 1)
(
Em
) α
Em(α),Π
or (0C)
α
C(α),Π
we could do much better and obtain C(α) from α in only two or one additional step. Actually the formulation of
Kωn (C) in Alberucci and Jäger [1] includes the rules (Em), but this difference is not important for the following.
Let us also mention some natural extensions of Kωn (C): The system Tωn (C) is obtained from Kωn (C) by adding the
rules
(˜Ki )
α,Γ
K˜i (α),Γ
which take care, in Tait-style systems, of the usual axiom (T ), stating that Ki (α) implies α. S4ωn (C) stands for the
infinitary Tait-style system of the multi-modal version of S4 with common knowledge and extends Tωn (C) by all rules
(4i )
α, K˜i (Γ ), C˜(Δ)
Ki (α), K˜i (Γ ), C˜(Δ),Π
which then allow us to prove positive introspection, namely that Ki (α) implies Ki (Ki (α)).
The auxiliary set of formulas Π in the conclusions of the rules (Ki ), (Em), (0C) and (4i ) are added just in order to
guarantee the weakening property of our calculi; that is, if Γ is provable and if Γ is a subset of Δ, then Δ is provable
(with the same length) as well. Trivially, these auxiliary sets could be dropped in these rules and a general weakening
rule added.
A Kripke-frameM is a model of Kωn (C) if all axioms of Kωn (C) are valid inM and ifM is closed under the rules
of inference of Kωn (C) with respect to validity. We call a formula α a semantic consequence of Kωn (C), in symbols
Kωn (C) |= α,
if α is valid in all models of Kωn (C). The following theorem states soundness and completeness of syntactic derivability
in Kωn (C) with respect to this notion of semantic consequence.
Theorem 1 (Soundness and completeness of Kωn (C)). The two systems Kωn (C) and Kωn (C) + (Cut) are sound and
complete with respect to our semantics; i.e. for all finite sets Γ of Ln(C) formulas we have
Kωn (C)  Γ ⇐⇒ Kn(C) |= Γ ∨ ⇐⇒ Kωn (C) + (Cut)  Γ.
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the completeness of Kωn (C) have to be established. Assertion (i) is more or less obvious; assertion (ii) is obtained by
a canonical model construction utilizing Kωn (C) saturated sets of Ln(C) formulas.
From Theorem 1 we also deduce that the two informal systems Kωn (C) and Kωn (C) + (Cut) prove the same Ln(C)
formulas. As a further consequence this theorem also states admissibility of cuts in Kωn (C). However, this is a form of
semantic cut elimination which does not provide a method of how proofs in Kωn (C) + (Cut) can be transformed into
proofs in Kωn (C).
4. Finitizing Kωn(C)
Given a Kripke-frameM, we define card(M) to be the cardinality of its universe |M|; accordingly,M is called
finite if card(M) < ω. As mentioned above, C(α) is generally treated as the infinite conjunction of the Em+1(α) for
all natural numbers m. But if we work over a finite Kripke-frameM, then C(α) is reached after finitely many iteration
steps.
Lemma 2. Suppose that α is an Ln(C) formula,M a model of Kn(C), V a valuation inM and m a natural number.
Then we have:
1. ‖∧mi=1 Ei (α)‖MV = ‖
∧m+1
i=1 Ei (α)‖MV ⇒ ‖C(α)‖MV = ‖
∧m
i=1 Ei (α)‖MV .
2. card(M)m ⇒ ‖C(α)‖MV = ‖
∧m
i=1 Ei (α)‖MV .
Proof. For the first assertion, simply show by induction on the natural number k that our assumption implies
‖∧mi=1 Ei (α)‖MV = ‖
∧m+k
i=1 Ei (α)‖MV . To establish the second part, consider the decreasing sequence∥∥∥∥∥
0∧
i=1
Ei (α)
∥∥∥∥∥
M
V
⊃
∥∥∥∥∥
1∧
i=1
Ei (α)
∥∥∥∥∥
M
V
⊃ · · · ⊃
∥∥∥∥∥
m∧
i=1
Ei (α)
∥∥∥∥∥
M
V
⊃
∥∥∥∥∥
m+1∧
i=1
Ei (α)
∥∥∥∥∥
M
V
of subsets of |M|. From card(M)m we conclude that not all of these m+2 sets can be different so that our assertion
follows from the first part of this lemma. 
In a next step the finite model property of Kn(C) comes into play. It states that each satisfiable formula α is
satisfied in a finite frame with at most 2(α) worlds and will allow us to collapse the infinite derivations in Kωn (C) to
finite derivations. This is possible since only finitely many premises for an application of the infinitary rule (ωC) are
really important.
Theorem 3 (Finite model property). If the Ln(C) formula α is satisfiable with respect to Kn(C), then there exist
a modelM of Kn(C), a valuation V inM and an element w of |M| so that
card(M) 2(α) and (M,V,w) |= α.
The proof of this theorem follows immediately from the proof of the completeness of Kn(C). All details can be
found again in Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi [4] or, for example, in Halpern and Moses [5] and Meyer and van der
Hoek [6].
The finite model property of Kn(C) is instrumental in designing a finitized version (<ωC) of the infinitary rule
(ωC). For any Ln(C) formula α and any finite set Γ = {β1, . . . , βm} of Ln(C) formulas we first define a bounding
function bd(α,Γ ) by
bd(α,Γ ) := 2(C(α))+(β1)+···+(βm)
which plays a crucial rôle in restricting (ωC) to a new finite subrule with only finitely many premises.
Lemma 4. Let α be an Ln(C) formula and Γ a finite set of Ln(C) formulas. Suppose, in addition, that
Kn(C) |= Em(α) ∨ Γ ∨
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Kn(C) |= C(α) ∨ Γ ∨.
Proof. We proceed indirectly and assume that the formula C(α) ∨ Γ ∨ is not valid with respect to Kn(C). Hence
¬(C(α) ∨ Γ ∨) is satisfiable with respect to Kn(C), and according to the previous theorem there exists a model M
of Kn(C) so that card(M)  bd(α,Γ ) and (M,V,w) |= C(α) ∨ Γ ∨ for some valuation V inM and some element
w ofM. This implies that Em(α) ∨ Γ ∨ is not valid with respect to Kn(C) for some m with 1  m  bd(α,Γ ). By
contraposition of this argument we have the assertion of our lemma. 
The following finite ω-rules for C is a restrictions of the rules (ωC) to finitely many premises, the number of which
depends on the length of the conclusion.
Finite ωC-rules. For all Ln(C) formulas α and all finite sets Γ,Π of Ln(C) formulas:
(<ωC)
. . .Em(α),Γ . . . (for all 1m bd(α,Γ ))
C(α),Γ,Π
.
The addition of (possibly empty) sets Π of side formulas in the conclusions of these rules is necessary for making
them stable under weakening.
The system K<ωn (C) is Kωn (C) with the ωC-rules (ωC) replaced by the finite ωC-rules (<ωC). Naturally, K<ωn (C)
is a finite system and all rules of K<ωn (C) have the subformula property, again with the proviso that the Em(α) are
regarded as subformulas of C(α).
The notion K<ωn (C) k Γ is introduced as Kωn (C) σ Γ , but with any (ωC) replaced by (<ωC). Since all rules
have finitely many premises only, natural numbers k are sufficient to bound the depth of proof trees. As a consequence,
we write K<ωn (C)  Γ if K<ωn (C) k Γ for some natural number k.
Whenever (ωC) is applicable, the rule (<ωC) can be applied as well since only a finite number of the infinitely
many premises are required. Therefore the following Lemma 5 is obvious. More problematic is the correctness of
(<ωC); it is shown in Lemma 6 and follows from the finite model property of Kn(C) in disguise of Lemma 4 above.
Lemma 5. For all finite sets Γ of Ln(C) formulas and all ordinals σ , we have that
Kωn (C) σ Γ ⇒ K<ωn (C)  Γ.
Proof. This assertion is proved by induction on σ . If Γ is an axiom of Kωn (C), then it is also an axiom of K<ωn (C).
If Γ is the conclusion of a basic rule of Kωn (C) or a C˜-rule of Kωn (C), then K<ωn (C)  Γ follows from the induction
hypothesis.
It remains to consider the case that Γ is the conclusion of a rule (ωC). Then we have a set Δ, a formula α and
ordinals σ1, σ2, . . . with the properties
Kωn (C) σm Em(α),Δ and σm < σ
for all natural numbers m greater than 0. Now we restrict our attention to the m between 1 and bd(α,Δ), apply the
induction hypothesis and obtain
K<ωn (C)  Em(α),Δ
for all m so that 1m bd(α,Δ). Hence (<ωC) implies K<ωn (C)  Γ , and our lemma is proved. 
Lemma 6. For all finite sets Γ of Ln(C) formulas and all natural numbers k, we have that
K<ωn (C) k Γ ⇒ Kn(C) |= Γ ∨.
Proof. We proceed by induction on k. If Γ is an axiom of K<ωn (C), then the assertion is obvious. If Γ is the conclusion
of a basic rule of K<ωn (C) or a C˜-rule of K<ωn (C), we apply the induction hypothesis to the premise(s) of this rule and
obtain Kn(C) |= Γ immediately.
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so that Γ is of the form C(α),Δ and we have
K<ωn (C) km Em(α),Δ and km < k
for all natural numbers m, 1m bd(α,Δ). By induction hypothesis we conclude
Kn(C) |= Em(α) ∨ Δ∨
for all 1m bd(α,Δ). It simply remains to utilize Lemma 4 which yields Kn(C) |= C(α) ∨ Δ∨ and completes the
proof of our lemma. 
Theorem 1 and Lemma 5 establish the completeness of our system K<ωn (C); Lemma 6 states its soundness. All
together, we obtain our main result about K<ωn (C).
Theorem 7 (Soundness and completeness of K<ωn (C)). The system K<ωn (C) is sound and complete with respect to our
semantics; i.e. for all finite sets Γ of Ln(C) formulas, we have
K<ωn (C)  Γ ⇐⇒ Kn(C) |= Γ ∨.
Notice that this theorem also implies the admissibility of cuts: adding cuts to K<ωn (C) does not increase its proof-
theoretic power.
5. Conclusion
The main achievement of this note is a positive answer to the old question whether a cut-free, sound and complete
finite formalization of common knowledge does exist: K<ωn (C) is a deductive system which satisfies all the required
properties. What is conceptually interesting (and new) is the fact that a model-theoretic property, the finite model
property, is directly integrated into a deductive system.
However, we also agree that this should not be the end of the story. As already mentioned, the inference rule (<ωC)
of K<ωn (C)—i.e. the finitary version of the very natural (infinitary) rule (ωC) of Kn(C) for introducing common
knowledge—is somewhat “unusual” in the sense that the number of its premises depends on the complexity of its
conclusion. This has some consequences with respect to the structural properties of K<ωn (C).
Inversion with respect to propositional conjunction and disjunction is a simple matter; more interesting is inversion
with respect to the modal operator C. In the infinitary calculus Kωn (C) it is evident that
Kωn (C) σ C(α),Γ ⇒ Kωn (C) σ Em(α),Γ
for all natural numbers m 1, all ordinals σ , all Ln(C) formulas α and all finite sets Γ of Ln(C) formulas. Turning
to the finite system K<ωn (C), definitely a weak form of C-inversion is available.
Weak C-inversion. For any Ln(C) formula α, any finite set Γ of Ln(C) formulas and any natural numbers k and m
with m 1 we have that
K<ωn (C) k C(α),Γ ⇒ K<ωn (C)  Em(α),Γ.
However, so far we have no information about the complexities of the derivations of Em(α),Γ in relationship to k, and
we do not even know whether a natural relationship of this sort exists at all. This gives rise to the following question:
Question. Assume the left hand side of the previous implication. Is it then the case that K<ωn (C) k Em(α),Γ for
all m where 1m bd(α,Γ )?
To see why this is rather intricate, assume that the answer to this question is “yes” and try to prove it by induction
on k. If C(α),Γ has been inferred in the last step by an application of (<ωC) with main formula C(α), then we have
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. . .Ei (β),C(α),Δ . . . (for all 1 i  bd(β, {C(α)} ∪ Δ))
C(β),C(α),Δ,Π
with a different main formula C(β). Then for any natural number i so that 1  i  bd(β, {C(α)} ∪ Δ) there exists
a ki < k for which
K<ωn (C) ki Ei (β),C(α),Δ.
Hence, by induction hypothesis, it is also the case that
K<ωn (C) ki Ei (β),Em(α),Δ,
and now the complications begin. Since, in general, bd(β, {C(α)} ∪Δ) is smaller than bd(β, {Em(α)} ∪Δ) we do not
have enough premises to derive the desired C(β),Em(α),Δ,Π by an application of (<ωC).
Another open problem in connection with K<ωn (C) is syntactic cut elimination. Let K<ωn (C) + (Cut) denote the
extension of K<ωn (C) which permits cuts as further rules of inference. In the face of Theorems 1 and 7 we know
that semantic cut elimination is available. However, the proof of this result does not give any information about the
relationship between the K<ωn (C)-proofs with and without cuts.
Question. Is there a syntactic procedure for transforming proofs in the system K<ωn (C)+(Cut) into proofs in K<ωn (C)?
If so, what are the complexity bounds?
We do not expect an easy answer to this question. As a preparatory step it might be reasonable to study the related
question first for infinitary Kωn (C) + (Cut) and Kωn (C). But even for this presumably much simpler system only
semantic cut elimination is at our disposal as yet.
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